Local election officials across the United States are increasingly seeking assistance from state governments to address cybersecurity and physical threats to electoral processes, following significant federal funding cuts to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). A recent Brennan Center for Justice survey of 858 local election officials revealed that 87% believe state and local governments must now play a crucial role in bridging the resource gap left by these federal reductions.
The Trump administration’s decision to scale back CISA’s election security activities has raised concerns among election officials about their ability to safeguard upcoming elections. Notably, 38% of respondents reported experiencing threats, harassment, or abuse related to their roles, underscoring the growing pressures within the electoral system.
CISA, established in 2018 to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure, including election systems, has been a key player in providing cybersecurity support to state and local election offices. However, recent actions by the Trump administration have curtailed CISA’s involvement in election security. In March 2025, the agency ended approximately $10 million in annual funding to the nonprofit Center for Internet Security, which managed the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center (EI-ISAC) and the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC).
These centers were instrumental in facilitating information sharing about security risks and best practices between election vendors and state and local election officials. Their defunding has left many election offices without critical resources to counter cyber threats. Arizona Secretary of State Adrian Fontes expressed concern, stating, “Right now, we are effectively flying blind,” highlighting the challenges faced by his office in coordinating with county election offices.
The funding cuts align with recommendations from Project 2025, a policy agenda developed by conservative organizations, which advocates for limiting CISA’s role in election security. The agenda suggests that CISA should focus solely on assessing cyber hygiene and refrain from involvement closer to elections.
In addition to funding cuts, CISA has experienced significant workforce reductions. Approximately one-third of its staff—around 1,000 employees—have departed during the second Trump administration, following a proposed 17% budget cut and early retirement offers. These departures have affected key units, including those focused on election integrity, raising concerns about the agency’s capacity to address cybersecurity threats effectively.
The Brennan Center survey also highlighted the personal toll on election officials. Beyond the 38% who reported threats or harassment, many officials expressed concerns about their safety and the safety of their colleagues. This environment has contributed to difficulties in retaining and recruiting election workers, potentially impacting the administration of future elections.
In response to the federal pullback, some states are taking proactive measures to bolster election security. Minnesota Secretary of State Steve Simon and Maine Secretary of State Shenna Bellows have both expressed the need for state-level initiatives to fill the void left by federal cuts. Bellows emphasized the importance of collaboration, stating, “We will find a way to protect our elections,” while acknowledging the challenges posed by sophisticated cyber threats.
As the 2026 midterm elections approach, the reliance on state and local governments to ensure the security and integrity of the electoral process is becoming increasingly critical. The shift underscores the need for robust support systems at the state level to address the evolving landscape of election security threats.
